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Abstract Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international
environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of D’Aspre-
mont et al. (Can J Econ 16:17–25, 1983) frequently assume that countries are identical,
and they can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by consider-
ing two self-enforcing IEAs and also two types of asymmetric countries. Extending a
model of Barrett (Oxford Econ Pap 46:878–894, 1994), we demonstrate that there are
similarities between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries
and high environmental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA work far better
than one self-enforcing IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental quality. Our
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simulation shows that only if all countries that have fewer benefits and higher cost
from pollution abatement must build one coalition, there is hope that two myopic
stable coalition can be formed. Moreover, if the cost-benefit functions of pollution
abatement impose that the first myopic coalition is formed by countries, which have
higher benefits and lower cost from pollution abatement, then two IEA’s worsen abate-
ment and welfare in comparison to one IEA. But, if the first myopic coalition is formed
by countries, which have smaller benefits and higher cost from pollution abatement,
then two IEA’s improve abatement and welfare in comparison to one IEA.
Keywords Self-enforcing international environmental agreements ·
Non-cooperative game theory · Stability · Nonlinear optimization
1 Introduction
The formation and implementation of International Environmental Agreements (IEA)
is the topic of a broad economic literature. A significant part of the literature uses
game theory as a tool to understand the formation mechanism of IEAs. There are two
main directions of literature on IEAs (for a review of current literature see (Finus
2003; Carraro and Siniscalco 1998; Ioannidis et al. 2000; Carraro et al. 2005). The
first direction utilizes the concepts of cooperative game theory in order to model the
formation of IEAs. This is a rather optimistic view, and it shows that an IEA signed
by all countries is stable provided that utility is transferable and side payments are
adequate (Chander and Tulkens 1995, 1997). The second direction uses the concepts
of non-cooperative game theory to model the formation of IEAs. At the first level,
the link between the economic activity and the physical environment is established in
order to generate the economical-ecological model. This link is established through a
social welfare function. The social welfare function captures the difference between
the profit from pollution and the environmental damage. Following this approach,
countries play a two stage-game. In the first stage, each country decides to join or not
the IEA. In the second stage, every country decides on emissions. The main body of
literature examining the formation of IEA within a two stage framework uses a certain
set of assumptions. We mention below only the essential ones:
• Decisions are simultaneous in both stages.
• Countries are presented with single agreements.
• When defecting from coalition, a country assumes that all other countries remain
in the coalition (this is a consequence of the employed stability concept of
D’Aspremont et al. (1983) that allows only singleton movements and myopia).
• Within the coalition, players play cooperatively while the coalition and single
countries compete in a non cooperative way.
Non-cooperative game theory draws a pessimistic picture of the prospect of successful
cooperation between countries. It claims that a large coalition of signatories is hardly
stable, and that the free-rider incentive is strong. The model explains the problems
of international cooperation in the attendance of environmental spillovers,but cannot
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explain IEAs with high membership such as the Montreal Protocol. This calls for a
modification of the standard assumptions. We mention in the following paragraphs
some of the possible modifications.
Maybe the most important development is the work on coalition theory of Ray and
Vohra (1994); Yi and Shin (1995); Yi (1997) and Bloch (1995, 1996); Bloch et al.
(1997). They allow many coalitions to be formed, although they employ a different
rule of forming coalitions. Ray and Vohra (1994) analyse Equilibrium Binding Agree-
ments (a game in which coalitions can only break up into smaller coalitions), Bloch
(1996) shows that the infinite-horizon Coalitional Unanimity game (game in which
a coalition is formed if and only if all members agree to form it) yields a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure. Yi and Shin (1995) examine an Open
Membership Coalitional game (in which nonmembers can join a coalition without
the permission of existing members). Yi (1997) shows that in the Open Membership
Coalitional game the grand coalition can be an equilibrium outcome for positive exter-
nalities. But for positive externalities in the Coalitional Unanimity game, the grand
coalition will be rarely an equilibrium. He shows also that for the same game, the
grand coalition can rarely be an equilibrium outcome for negative externalities due to
free-rider problems.
A sequential choice of emission levels means there is a Stackelberg leader (a coali-
tion of signatories), who takes into account the optimal choice of non-signatories that
behave as Stackelberg followers (Barrett 1994, 1997a). Participants have an advan-
tage towards non-participants as they chose the emissions level based on the reaction
functions of non-participants.
Ecchia and Mariotti (1998) distinguish two problems in the standard model of self-
enforcing IEA. In the basic model, countries are presumed to behave myopically by
disregarding other countries’ reaction when they make their choices. They modify this
assumption by introducing the notion of farsightedness. If countries are farsighted,
that is they can foresee other countries’ reaction to their choices and incorporate them
into their decisions, a new notion of stability has to be established. The authors demon-
strate that if the idea of farsightedness is placed into the model, the likelihood of larger
coalition increases. Considering asymmetric countries, transfers can help to increase
membership and success of IEAs (Botteon and Carraro 1997; Carraro and Siniscalco
1993; Barrett 1997b).
Jeppesen and Andersen (1998) demonstrate that if some countries are committed
to cooperation concerning their abatement implies that this group of countries presup-
poses a leader role in forming the coalition. The leading role allows them to evaluate
potential aggregate benefits from increasing the coalition and device side payments to
countries that have a follower role in order to attain optimum membership.
Hoel and Schneider (1997) integrate a non-environmental cost function from not
signing the IEA which they call “non-material payoff”. They find that, even in the
absence of side payments the number of signatories is not very small.
Barrett (1997b) uses a partial equilibrium model to observe the effectiveness of
trade sanctions in signing an IEA. He considers only traded goods that are linked to
environmental problems. He explains that if the public good agreement is linked to
a club agreement, such as a trade agreement, the membership in IEAs can be raised.
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Botteon and Carraro (1997), Carraro and Siniscalco (1998), Breton and Soubeyran
(1998) and Katsoulacos (1997) give similar conclusions.
Carraro et al. (2001) make obvious that the implementation of a minimum partic-
ipation clause can help to improve the success of IEAs. Such a clause implies that a
treaty only enters into force if a certain number of signatories has approved it. The
minimum participation clauses are found in most IEAs in the past.
Endres (1996, 1997) shows that the bargaining outcome under the inefficient uni-
form emission reduction quota regime may have better-quality from an ecological and
economic point of view than an efficient uniform tax rate in a two-country model.
Endres and Finus (2002); Finus and Rundshagen (1998a,b) demonstrate that an inef-
ficient emission reduction under the quota regime is rewarded by higher stability and
higher membership.
This paper uses non-cooperative game theory in order to develop further a model
from Barrett (1994). We are aware of the recent work on coalition theory by Ray
and Vohra (1994); Yi and Shin (1995) and Bloch (1996); Bloch et al. (1997) who
consider symmetric players. We think that modeling two self-enforcing IEA with
asymmetric players (we present two types of players) can bring a better under-
standing of improving capacity of IEA’s. We are less concerned with developing
a general theory of coalition formation. Rather, we present and apply a method
for computing the welfare and abatement improvement of two coalitions. The loss
in generality is compensated by a gain in practically. The main contribution of
this paper is the discussion on the possibility of improving capability (welfare,
emission reduction and size) of two self-enforcing IEA with asymmetric play-
ers comparedto one self-enforcing IEA by modeling the IEA as a one-shot game.
Another contribution is a different formulation (as nonlinear optimization prob-
lem) of finding α(αN = the number of signatories) in extended Barrett’s model.
Although our work is less general than that of Yi and Shin, Bloch etc. we actu-
ally count up for asymmetric players and are able to compute the coalition sizes and
optimal abatement levels. We would like to stress that we reinforce the conclusions of
Asheim et al. (2006) and Carraro (2000) by following a different method, that is the
nonlinear optimization.
In our modeling approach, the coalition of signatories (or the first coalition when
we have two coalitions) behaves always like a Stackelberg leader. We consider as
more realistic to assume that the countries react to climate change (as a consequence
to coalition formation) in different stages (which is similar to Stackelberg game) and
not simultaneously (which is similar to Nash-Cournot game). On the other side, it is
considerable work to consider the Stackelberg game, and it follows that the Nash-
Cournot case will be subject to further research.
In Sect. 2 we describe Barrett’s model of one-self enforcing IEA and formulate it
differently as a nonlinear optimization problem. In Sect. 3, we present our model for
one-self enforcing IEA with asymmetric countries. In Sects. 4 and 5, we present our
model for two-self enforcing IEA with symmetric and asymmetric countries. Section
6 discusses our simulation results, while section seven provide our conclusions. In the
Appendix, different tables of results are presented.
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2 Barrett’s Model, One Self-Enforcing IEA with Symmetric Countries
For an IEA to be self-enforcing means that no single nonsignatory has an incentive
to join an IEA (External Stability) and no single signatory has an incentive to with-
draw from the agreements (Internal Stability). Furthermore, the coalition has to be
profitable, that is the coalition members pay-off is greater than their pay-off in Nash’s
equilibrium. The IEA’s have to be designed so that they are self-enforcing because of
nonexistence of a supranational authority that can implement and enforce the agree-
ments. The striking result of Barrett’s research is that a self-enforcing IEA can be
signed by a large number of countries only when the difference between fullcoopera-
tive and noncooperative payoffs is small. When this difference is large, self-enforcing
IEA would be signed only by a small number of countries.
The model makes some important assumptions, which are:
• all countries are identical,
• each country’s net benefit function is known and known to be known, etc. by all
countries
• pollution abatement is the only policy instrument,
• abatement levels are instantly and costlessly observable,
• the pollutant does not accumulate in the environment,
• costs are independent of one another.
The abatement benefits function Bi (Q), the abatement cost function Ci (qi ) and the
profit function π of country i are defined as:
Bi (Q) = b
(
aQ − Q2/2) /N (1)
Ci (qi ) = cq2i /2 (2)
πi = Bi (Q) − Ci (qi ) (3)
a ∈ R+, b ∈ R+ and c ∈ R+ parameters, qi amount of abatement of country i , Q
global abatement Q = ∑Ni=1 qi , N number of identical countries, each of them emits
a pollutant.
The marginal abatement benefit and cost of country i are linear, b is the slope of
marginal benefit and c is the slope of marginal cost.
The full cooperative outcome is found by maximizing global net benefits  =∑N
i=1 πi with respect to Q. The fullcooperative abatement levels are:
Qc = aN/(N + γ ) (4)
qc = a/(N + γ ) (5)
Qc global abatement, qc individual’s country abatement, γ = c/b.
The noncooperative outcome is found by maximizing country net benefits π with
respect to qi . The noncooperative abatement levels are:
Q0 = a/(1 + γ ) (6)
q0 = a/N (1 + γ ) (7)
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Q0 global abatement, q0 individual’s country abatement.
It is obvious that Qc > Q0.
2.1 One Self-Enforcing IEA with Symmetric Countries
We have αN countries that sign the IEA (signatories) forming a coalition and (1−α)N
countries that do not sign the agreements (nonsignatories). In the first stage, the coa-
lition of signatories (Cs) try to maximize their net-benefits, the coalition behaves
like Stackelberg leader (Barrett 1994). In the second stage, every nonsignatory try to
maximize his own benefit (after observing the behavior of signatories), they behave
like Stackelberg followers. Modelling Cs as a cooperative game, the Nash bargaining
solution will require that each country undertake the same level of abatement. This
implies that if Qs is the total abatement of signatories and qs is the single signatory
abatement then Qs = αNqs . Let Qn be the total abatement of nonsignatories and
qn be the single nonsignatory abatement. As countries are identical the Nash equilib-
rium requires that qn are identical thus Qn = (1 − α)Nqn . The reaction function of
nonsignatories is given by:
Qn(α, Qs) = (1 − α)(a − Qs)/(γ + 1 − α) (8)
In order to find Qs(α) the following nonlinear optimization problem needs to be
solved:
max s(Qs) s.t (8) (9)
where s is the total benefit of signatories, πs is the single benefit of a signatory,
s = ∑πs . The solution is:
Q∗s (α) = aα2 Nγ /[(γ + 1 − α)2 + α2 Nγ ] (10)
By substituting (10) into (8) it follows that:
Q∗n(α) = a(1 − α)(γ + 1 − α)/[(γ + 1 − α)2 + α2 Nγ ] (11)
Let’s define the self-enforcing (SE) IEA. We recall a concept developed for the anal-
ysis of cartel stability by D’Aspremont et al. (1983). We assume that we have αN
signatories: (Table 1)
Definition 2.1 An IEA is self-enforcing if and only if it satisfies the following con-
ditions:
πs(α) ≥ πn(α − 1/N ) (12)
and
πn(α) ≥ πs(α + 1/N ) (13)
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Table 1 A simple algorithm for
finding α for one self-enforcing
IEA
f or i = 1 to N
α = i/N
if [πs (α) ≥ πn(α − 1/N ) ∧ πn(α) ≥ πs (α + 1/N )]
save α
If the inequality (12) is satisfied, then no signatory wants to withdraw from the IEA.
It will reduce costs, but it will reduce benefits even more. This aspect of stability
is known as Internal Stability. Similarly no nonsignatory wants to join the IEA, see
Eq. 13. It will raise benefits, but it will raise costs even more. This aspect of stability
is known as External Stability. For both cases any movement of any country (joining
or withdrawing from IEA) will reduce its profit.
A very simple algorithm for finding α(i = number of signatories) can be: Please
note that for our function’s specification, we have only one α. We introduce a new
formulation of our problem. We formulate it as a nonlinear optimization, because this
formulation can be used to solve the problem of two self-enforcing IEA too.
max α (14)
s.t [πs(α) ≥ πn(α − 1/N ) ∧ πn(α) ≥ πs(α + 1/N )] (15)
The problem can be formulated as of minimization one.1
3 Our Model, One Self-Enforcing IEA with Asymmetric Countries
In order to have a more realistic picture of coalition formation, asymmetric countries
are introduced.2 There are two types of countries, type one and type two. Type one
can be non-signatory or signatory of the first IEA, while type two can be only non-
signatory.
Let’s summarize the notation that we use in this section:
N : total number of countries
α1 N : total number of countries in the IEA (or coalition), which are countries of
type one
α2 N : total number of non-signatories, which are countries of type one,
α3 N : total number of non-signatories, which are countries of type one,
Q = Qs + Qn , where Q : total abatement level,
Qs : total abatement level of coalition of signatories,
Qn : total abatement level of non-signatories,
Qn = Qn1 + Qn2 ,
1 αN usually will not be an integer number, but we round down, then find αnew = rounddown(αN )/N .
Using Matlab Optimization Toolbox, minimization proved to be more robust. In our experience, the starting
point can be slightly problematic, but as we know that α ∈ [0, 1] it is easily overcome.
2 Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2001) show that an IEA’s in Barrett’s model with symmetric countries,
can have mostly four countries, if emissions are positive. In order to avoid this shortcoming, asymmetric
countries are introduced.
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Qn1 : total abatement levels of non-signatories of first type,
Qn2 : total abatement levels of non-signatories of second type,
πs : the profit of a country of the coalition of signatories,
s = ∑α1 N1 πi = α1 Nπs the total profit of the coalition of signatories,
qs : the abatement level of a country of the coalition of signatories,
πn1 : the profit of a country of non-signatories of first type,
n1 =
∑α1 N
1 πi = α1 Nπn1 the total profit of non-signatories of first type,
qn1 : the abatement level of a country of of non-signatories of first type,
πn2 : the profit of a country of of non-signatories of second type,
n2 =
∑α2 N
1 πi = α2 Nπn2 the total profit of non-signatories of second type,
qn2 : the abatement level of a country of non-signatories of second type,
The profit function of a country i for the first coalition, non-signatories of first type
and for non-signatories of second type, is given by:
πs = b(a1 Q − Q2/2)/N − c1q2s1/2
πn1 = b(a1 Q − Q2/2)/N − c1q2n1/2
πn2 = b(a2 Q − Q2/2)/N − c2q2n2/2
The first type of countries have parameters a1, b and c1, while the second type of
countries have parameters a2, b and c2.
As there are asymmetric countries, in order to find if the coalition is myopic stable,
we need to solve more than one nonlinear optimization problem. This occurs because
as alpha changes, the objective function and non-linear constrains change their form.
In the initial nonlinear optimization problem (16–18), the α1 N players of the first
type maximize their total welfare (which is the objective function) and are the Stac-
kelberg leader, see Eq. 16. There are α2 N members of non-signatories of first type.
Every non-signatory maximizes its own welfare. This is the reaction function of non-
signatories of first type and the first constrain of our initial optimization problem.
The non-signatories are Stackelberg followers, see Eq. 17. There are α3 N non-signa-
tories of the second type. Each of them maximizes its own welfare, this is the reaction
function of non-signatories of second type, and the second constrain of our initial
optimization problem. They are also Stackelberg follower, see Eq. 18.
max(α1 Nπs) (16)
s.t
d(πn1)/d(qn1) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs + (α2 + γ1)Nqn1 + α3 Nqn2 = a1 (17)
d(πn2)/d(qn2) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs + α2 Nqn1 + (α3 + γ2)Nqn2 = a2 (18)
Solving the initial optimization problem (16–18), we receive the abatement level
for a single country of the coalition, non-signatories of first type and second type
q1s , q1n1 and q
1
n2 . Then we are able to calculate the profit of a single player of the first
123
The Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements 101
coalition, non-signatories of first type and second type which are necessary to find if
our coalition is myopic stable. We name these profits by π1s , π1n1 and π
1
n2 .
Then we suppose that a non-signatory of first type joins the coalition (which has
only the first type of players). This implies that α1 = α1 +1./N and α2 = α2 −1./N .
For the new alpha’s we solve again the optimization problem (16–18) and find the profit
of a single player for the coalition, non-signatories of first type and second type (after
we have found the abatement levels of them), which we name by π2s , π2n1 and π2n2 .
After reassigning the alpha’s again to their starting values, we suppose that a mem-
ber of first coalition, which is a first type player becomes a non-signatory. This implies
that α1 = α1 − 1./N and α2 = α2 + 1./N . For the new alpha’s we solve again the
optimization problem (16–18) and find the profit of a single player for the coalition,
non-signatories of first type and second type (after we have found the abatement levels
of them), which we name by π3s , π3n1 and π3n2 .
After reassigning the alpha’s again to their starting values, we suppose that a non-
signatory of second type joins the coalition (which has only first type players). This
implies that α3 = α3 − 1./N . For the new alpha’s we solve the new optimization
problem (19–21). In this optimization problem, we have to treat the abatement level of
the country that leaves the non-signatories of second type and joins the coalition as a
new variable, q4∗s . After solving the optimization problem, we receive the abatement
levels for a single country that belongs to the coalition, non-signatories of first type,
second type and the single country that leaves the non-signatories of second type and
joins the coalition; we name these abatement levels by q4s , q4n1 , q4n2 and q4∗s . Then we
are able to find the profit of a single player that belongs to coalition, non-signatories of
first type, second type and the single country that leaves the non-signatories of second
type and joins the coalition; we name these profits by π4s , π4n1 , π4n2 and π4∗s .
max(α1 Nπs + π4∗s ) (19)
s.t
d(πn1)/d(qn1) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs + (α2 + γ1)Nqn1 + α3 Nqn2 + q4∗s = a1 (20)
d(πn2)/d(qn2) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs + α2 Nqn1 + (α3 + γ2)Nqn2 + q4∗s = a2 (21)
We state below the conditions which are satisfied, when a myopic stable coalition
of first type of countries is build.
Definition 3.1 A coalition of first type of countries is myopic stable if and only if the
conditions (22–24) are satisfied:
π1n1 ≥ π2s ⇐⇒ if a nonsignatory of the first type joins the coalition it does
not increase its profit (22)
π1s ≥ π2n1 ⇐⇒ if a member of the coalition joins the nonsignatories
it doesnot increase its profit (23)
π1n2 ≥ π4∗s ⇐⇒ if a nonsignatory of the second type joins
the coalition it doesnot increase its profit (24)
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Table 2 Algorithm for finding a myopic stable coalition
a1, a2, b1, b2, c, α1, α2, α3, N are known parameters γ1 = c/b1 and γ2 = c/b2 optimization procedure
finds the abatement levels q, and then calculate profit π for a country which belongs to the coalition or
nonsignatories
Solving the initial optimization problem (16–18), we receive the abatement levels for a single country of
the coalition (C), and nonsignatories of first type and second type q1s , q1n1 and q1n2 and calculate the
profit for them π1s , π1n1 and π
1
n2
α1 = α1 + 1./N and α2 = α2 − 1./N , we solve again the initial optimization problem (16–18) and
calculate the profit of single player of C , and nonsignatories of first type and second type (after we have
found the abatement levels of them), which we name by π2s , π2n1 and π2n2
Reassign alpha’s again to their initial values, α1 = α1 − 1./N and α2 = α2 + 1./N
α1 = α1 − 1./N and α2 = α2 + 1./N , we solve again the initial optimization problem (16–18) and
calculate the profit of single player of C , and nonsignatories of first type and second type (after we have
found the abatement levels of them), which we name by π3s , π3n1 and π3n2
Reassign alpha’s again to their initial values, α1 = α1 + 1./N and α2 = α2 − 1./N
Let α3 = α3 − 1./N , we solve the new optimization problem (19–21) and calculate the profit of single
player of C , nonsignatories of first type and second type and the single country (after we have found the
abatement levels of them) that leaves the nonsignatories of second type and joins C , which we name by
π4s , π
4
n1 , π
4
n2 and π
4∗
s
If π1n1 ≥ π2s ∧ π1s ≥ π2n1 ∧ π1n2 ≥ π4∗s then coalition C is myopic stable
After we solve all optimization problems, we inspect if conditions (22–24) are satis-
fied. Then, we know if a coalition is myopic stable or not. All the steps for finding a
myopic stable coalition, which we explained, are also shortly described in Table 2.
We also find interesting to consider another way of forming an IEA (or coalition)
with asymmetric countries, namely when all countries of second type build an IEA.
The difference with the first approach is that, there are no signatories, which are the
same type as the countries that form the coalition. The coalition behaves like a Stac-
kelberg leader, and non-signatories behave like Stackelberg follower. Clearly there are
(α1 + α2)N non-signatories of first type, and α3 N coalition members of second type;
let α∗1 = α1 + α2, so we have only α1 and α3.
As already mentioned, in order to find if a coalition is myopic stable, we need to
solve more than one nonlinear optimization problem.
max(α3 Nπs) (25)
s.t
d(πn)/d(qn) = 0 ⇐⇒ (α∗1 + γ1)Nqn + α3 Nqs = a1 (26)
Solving the new initial optimization problem (25–26), we receive the abatement
level for a single country of the coalition and non-signatories q1s and q1n . Then, we are
able to calculate the profit of a single player of the first coalition and non-signatories,
which are necessary to find if our coalition is myopic stable. We name these profits
by π1s and π1n .
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We suppose that a member of coalition (which has only second type of players)
leaves the coalition and becomes the only non-signatory of second type. This implies
that α3 = α3 − 1./N . For the new alpha’s, we solve the new optimization problem
(27–29). In this optimization problem, we have to treat (again) the abatement level
of the country that leaves the coalition and joins the non-signatory as a new vari-
able, q2∗n . After solving the optimization problem, we receive the abatement level for
a country that belongs to the coalition, non-signatories and the single country that
left the coalition and joined the non-signatories; we name these abatement levels by
q2s , q2n and q2∗n . Then, we are able to find the single profit of countries that belong to
coalition, non-signatories and the single country that left the coalition and joined the
non-signatories; we name these profits by π2s , π2n and π2∗n .
max(α3 Nπs) (27)
s.t
d(πn)/d(qn) = 0 ⇐⇒ (α∗1 + γ1)Nqn + α3 Nqs = a1 (28)
d(πn∗)/d(qn∗) = 0 ⇐⇒ α∗1 Nqn + (1 + γ1 N )qn∗ + α3 Nqs = a2 (29)
After reassigning the alpha’s again to their starting values, we suppose that a non-sig-
natory joins the coalition. This implies that α∗1 = α∗1 − 1./N . For the new alpha’s, we
solve the new optimization problem (30–31). In this optimization problem, we have to
treat (again) the abatement level of the non-signatory that joins the coalition as a new
variable, q3∗s . The optimization problem provides us the abatement level for a country
that belongs to the coalition, non-signatories and the single non-signatory that joined
the coalition; we name these abatement levels by q3s , q3n and q3∗s . Then, we are able
to find the single profit of country that belongs to coalition, non-signatories and the
single non-signatory that joined the coalition; we name these profits by π3s , π3n and
π3∗s .
max(α3 Nπs) (30)
s.t
d(πn)/d(qn) = 0 ⇐⇒ (α∗1 + γ1)Nqn + α3 Nqs = a1 (31)
We state below the conditions which are satisfied, when a myopic stable coalition
of second type of countries is built.
Definition 3.2 A coalition of second type of countries is myopic stable if and only if
the conditions (32–33) are satisfied:
π1n ≥ π2∗s ⇐⇒ if a nonsignatory joins the coalition it does not increase
its profit. (32)
π1s ≥ π2∗n ⇐⇒ if a member of the coalition joins the nonsignatories it does
not increase its profit. (33)
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Table 3 Algorithm for finding a myopic stable coalition
a1, a2, b1, b2, c, α1, α2, α3, N are known parameters α∗1 = α1 + α2, γ1 = c/b1 and γ2 = c/b2
optimization procedure finds the abatement levels q, and then calculate profit π for a country which
belongs to the coalition or nonsignatories
Solving the initial optimization problem (25–26), we receive the abatement levels for a single country of
the coalition (C), and nonsignatories q1s and q1n and calculate the profit for them π1s and π1n
α3 = α3 − 1./N , we solve the new initial optimization problem (27–29) and calculate the profit of single
player of C , nonsignatories and the single country that left the coalition and joined the nonsigantories
(after we have found the abatement levels of them), which we name by π2s , π2n and π2∗n
Reassign alpha’s again to their initial values α3 = α3 + 1./N
α∗1 = α∗1 − 1./N , we solve the new initial optimization problem (30–31) and calculate the profit of single
player of C , nonsignatories and the single country that left the nonsignatoies and joined the coalition
(after we have found the abatement levels of them), which we name by π3s , π3n and π3∗s
If π1s ≥ π2∗n ∧ π1n ≥ π3∗s then coalition C is myopic stable
Then after we solve all optimization problems, we test if conditions (32–33) are sat-
isfied, and we know if a coalition is myopic stable or not. All the steps of for finding
a myopic stable coalition, which we explained, are also shortly described in Table 3.
4 Our Model, Two Self-Enforcing IEA with Symmetric Countries
In the case of two self-enforcing agreements, we have two coalitions of signatories;
the first coalition (Cs1) with α1 N countries, and the second one (Cs2) with α2 N
countries, and (1 − α1 − α2)N nonsignatories (Cn). Firstly, the coalition of sig-
natories (Cs1) (Stackelberg leader3) and the second coalition of signatories (Cs2)
(which are Stackelberg follower) are formed; they try to maximize their net-benefits;
every coalition knows the number of countries in the other coalition. After observing
the choice of signatories, every nonsignatory (which are also Stackelberg followers)
maximizes its own net benefit by taking the abatement level of signatories coali-
tion and other nonsignatories as given. Let Qs1 be the total abatement of Cs1 , qs1
be the single signatory abatement of Cs1 ; let Qs2 be the total abatement of Cs2 , qs2
be the single signatory abatement of Cs2 ; let Qn be the total abatement of Cn, qn
be the single signatory abatement of Cn . The same arguments as before imply that
Qs1 = α1qs1 N , Qs2 = α2qs2 N , Qn = (1 − α1 − α2)qn N .
Let’s summarize the notation that we use in this section:
α = α1 + α2,
Q = Qs + Qn ,
Q : total abatement level,
Qs : total abatement level of two coalition of signatories,
Qn : total abatement level of nonsignatories,
Qs = Qs1 + Qs2 ,
3 Note that this sequential game can be easily changed by taking as Stackelberg leader Cs2 . Or by taking
both of Cs1 and Cs2 as Stackelbergs leaders playing a simultaneous Nash-Cournot equilibrium between
each-other.
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Qs1 : total abatement level of first coalition,
Qs2 : total abatement level of second coalition,
πs1 : the profit of a country of first coalition of signatories,
s1 =
∑α1 N
1 πi = α1 Nπs1 the total profit of first coalition of signatories,
qs1 : the abatement level of a country of first coalition of signatories,
πs2 : the profit of a country of first coalition of signatories,
s2 =
∑α2 N
1 πi = α2 Nπs2 the total profit of second coalition of signatories,
qs2 : the abatement level of a country of first coalition of signatories,
πn : the profit of a country of nonsignatories,
qn : the abatement level of a country of nonsignatories
The profit function of country i for the first, the second coalition of signatories and
for nonsignatories is given by:
πs1 = b(aQ − Q2/2)/N − cq2s1/2
πs2 = b(aQ − Q2/2)/N − cq2s2/2
πn = b(aQ − Q2/2)/N − cq2n/2
The Stackelberg game can be formulated as a nonlinear optimization problem
(34–36), the α1 N players maximize their total welfare (which is the objective func-
tion, see Eq. 34 and are the Stackelberg leader. The α2 N members of second coalition
maximize their total welfare, this is the reaction function of second coalition and the
first constrain of our optimization problem, see Eq. 35. The second coalition is a
Stackelberg follower. There are α3 N players, which do not belong to any coalition.
Each of them maximizes its own welfare, this is the reaction function of non-signato-
ries and the second constrain of our optimization problem, see Eq. 36. They are also
Stackelberg followers.
max(α1 Nπs1) ⇐⇒ d(s1)/d(Qs1) = 0 ⇐⇒ Qs1 = f (α1, α2, Qs2 , Qn) (34)
s.t
d(s2)/d(Qs2) = 0 ⇐⇒ Qs2 = f (α1, α2, Qs1 , Qn) (35)
d(n)/d(qn) = 0 ⇐⇒ Qn = (1 − α)(a − Qs)/(γ + 1 − α)
= f (α1, α2, Qs1 , Qs2) (36)
The constrained optimization problem (34–36) can be transformed to a nonconstrained
one. Firstly, we replace the Eq. 36 to Eq. 35 (and receive Qs2 = f (α1, α2, Qs1)). After-
ward, we replace the Eqs. 36 and 35 to the objective function (34) (and receive4
Qs1 = f (α1, α2)). Clearly, after these replacements, we have a nonconstrain opti-
mization problem. As we have Qs1 = f (α1, α2), we replace it (now backward) in
Qs2 = f (Qs1, α1, α2) and have Qs2 = fs2(α1, α2). We replace both of them in Eq. 36
4 We do not write explicitly Qs2 = f (α1, α2, Qs1 ) and Qs1 = f (α1, α2) because of the lengthy analytical
formula.
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then we receive Qn = fn(α1, α2). Finally we have all πs2 ,s2 , πs1 ,s1 , πn,n as
f (α1, α2).
In order to find α1 and α2 we need to formulate a different optimization problem.
We need the conditions of one self-enforcing agreements to be satisfied among three
groups of countries, the coalition one of signatories, (Cs1), the coalition two of signa-
tories, (Cs2) and the nonsignatories, (Cn) in order to have intercoalition stability. This
notion of intercoalition stability is firstly introduced (in a more general formulation)
by Carraro (1999), which is an extension of myopic stability of D’Aspremont et al.
(1983) when two (or more) coalitions are formed. The intercoalition stability means
stable relations between Cs2 and Cn, Cs1 and Cs2 as well as Cs1 and Cs2 .
Definition 4.1 We have intercoalition stability if and only if the following conditions
(37–39) are satisfied:
[
πs1(α1, α2) ≥ πn(α1 − 1/N , α2) ∧ πn(α1, α2) ≥ πs1(α1 + 1/N , α2)
] (37)
[
πs2(α1, α2) ≥ πn(α1, α2 − 1/N ) ∧ πn(α1, α2) ≥ πs2(α1, α2 + 1/N )
] (38)
[
πs2(α1, α2) ≥ πs1(α1 + 1/N , α2 − 1/N )
∧ πs1(α1, α2) ≥ πs2(α1 − 1/N , α2 + 1/N )
] (39)
It is important to note that conditions (37–39) together describe all possible changes
among Cs1 , Cs2 and Cn if only one country is changing its position. Clearly any change
in any country position reduces its profit. In other words, they guarantee stability among
two coalitions and nonsignatories, so they guarantee intercoalition stability.
Now we are ready to formulate the nonlinear optimization problem that helps us to
find α1 and α2.
max(α1 + α2) (40)[
πs1(α1, α2) ≥ πn(α1 − 1/N , α2) ∧ πn(α1, α2) ≥ πs1(α1 + 1/N , α2)
] (41)
[
πs2(α1, α2) ≥ πn(α1, α2 − 1/N ) ∧ πn(α1, α2) ≥ πs2(α1, α2 + 1/N )
] (42)
[
πs2(α1, α2) ≥ πs1(α1 + 1/N , α2 − 1/N ) ∧ πs1(α1, α2)
≥ πs2(α1 − 1/N , α2 + 1/N )
] (43)
The constrains of above optimization problem are just the conditions (37), (38) and
(39).
As one would expect the starting point and rounding are cumbersome.5
5 The starting point is slightly problematic but with the help of the algorithm in Table 1 we can find a
starting point for α1. As the interval of α2 is small, it is not difficult to find the second starting point. As
with the case of one self-enforcing IEA, α1 N and α2 N will usually not be integer numbers, so we only can
round both down and find the new αnew1 = rounddown(α1 N )/N and αnew2 = rounddown(α2 N )/N .
After rounding down, we check if six constrains are still satisfied (for one self-enforcing IEA, there were
only two constrains).
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5 Our Model, Two Self-Enforcing IEA with Asymmetric Countries
In this section, two IEA’s are modeled by considering asymmetric countries. There
are two types of countries, type one and type two. Type 1 can be a signatory or non-
signatory of the first IEA, while all type 2 countries build the second IEA.6
Let’s summarize the notation that we use in this section:
N : total number of countries
α1 N : total number of countries in the first IEA (or first coalition), which are coun-
tries of type one
α2 N : total number of countries in the second IEA (or second coalition), which are
countries of type two
α3 N : total number of non-signatories, which are countries of type one,
Q = Qs + Qn , where Q : total abatement level,
Qs : total abatement level of two coalition of signatories,
Qn : total abatement level of non-signatories,
Qs = Qs1 + Qs2 ,
Qs1 : total abatement level of first coalition,
Qs2 : total abatement level of second coalition,
πs1 : the profit of a country of first coalition of signatories,
s1 =
∑α1 N
1 πi = α1 Nπs1 the total profit of first coalition of signatories,
qs1 : the abatement level of a country of first coalition of signatories,
πs2 : the profit of a country of first coalition of signatories,
s2 =
∑α2 N
1 πi = α2 Nπs2 the total profit of second coalition of signatories,
qs2 : the abatement level of a country of first coalition of signatories,
πn : the profit of a country of non-signatories,
qn : the abatement level of a country of non-signatories.
The profit function of country i for the first coalition, the second coalition of signatories
and for non-signatories is given by:
πs1 = b(a1 Q − Q2/2)/N − c1q2s1/2
πs2 = b(a2 Q − Q2/2)/N − c2q2s2/2
πn = b(a1 Q − Q2/2)/N − c1q2n/2
It is clear that first type of countries have parameters a1, b and c1, while second type
of countries have parameters a2, b and c2.
As there are asymmetric countries in order to find if a couple of coalitions are myo-
pic stable, we need to solve more than one nonlinear optimization problem. It occurs
because, as alpha changes the objective function and non-linear constrains change their
forms. This is a central point and we are going to explain in the following paragraphs.
In the initial nonlinear optimization problem (44–46), the α1 N players of the first
type maximize their total welfare (which is the objective function, see Eq. 44) and are
6 Our numerical computations show that all countries of second type must build one IEA. If not, then two
myopic stable coalitions are impossible to be formed. We will come back to this peculiar point in sections
of Simulations and Conclusions.
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the Stackelberg leader. The α2 N members of second coalition maximize their total
welfare, this is the reaction function of second coalition and the first constrain of our
optimization problem, see Eq. 45. The second coalition is a Stackelberg follower. There
are α3 N players, which do not belong to any coalition. Each of them maximizes its
own welfare, this is the reaction function of non-signatories and the second constrain
of our optimization problem, see Eq. 46. They are also Stackelberg followers.
max(α1 Nπs1) (44)
s.t
d(s2)/d(Qs2) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs1 + (γ2/α2 + α2 N )qs2 + α3 Nqn = a2 (45)
d(n)/d(qn) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs1 + α2 Nqs2 + (α3 + γ1)Nqn = a1 (46)
Solving the initial optimization problem (44–46), we receive the abatement level for
a single country of the first coalition, second coalition and non-signatories q1s1 , q
1
s2
and q1n . It follows that we are able to calculate the profit of a single player of the
first coalition, second coalition and non-signatories, which are necessary to find if our
coalitions are myopic stable. We name these profits by π1s1 , π
1
s2 and π
1
n .
Then, we suppose that a non-signatory (which is a player of first type) joins the
first coalition (which has only players of first type). This implies that α1 = α1 + 1./N
and α3 = α3 − 1./N . For the new alpha’s, we solve again the optimization problem
(44–46) and find the profit of a single player of the first coalition, second coalition and
non-signatories (after we have found the abatement levels of them), which we name
by π2s1 , π
2
s2 and π
2
n .
After reassigning the alpha’s again to their starting values, we suppose that a mem-
ber of first coalition joins the non-signatories. This implies that α1 = α1 − 1./N
and α3 = α3 + 1./N . For the new alpha’s, we solve again the optimization problem
(44–46) and find the profit of a single player of the first coalition, second coalition and
non-signatories, which we name by π3s1 , π
3
s2 and π
3
n .
After reassigning the alpha’s again their starting values, we suppose that a member
of first coalition joins the second coalition (which has only players of second type).
This implies that α1 = α1 − 1./N . For the new alpha’s, we solve the new optimiza-
tion problem (47–49). In this optimization problem, we have to treat the abatement
level of the country that leaves the first coalition and joins the second one as a new
variable, q4∗s2 . After solving the optimization problem, we receive the abatement level
for a single country of the first coalition, second coalition, non-signatories and the
single country that leaves the first coalition and joins the second one; we name these
abatement levels by q4s1 , q
4
s2 , q
4
n and q4∗s2 . Afterwards, we are able to find the profit of a
single player of the first coalition, second coalition, non-signatories, and of the single
country that leaves the first coalition and joins the second one; we name these profits
by π4s1 , π
4
s2 , π
4
n and π4∗s2 .
max(α1 Nπs1) (47)
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s.t
d(s2)/d(Qs2) = 0 ⇐⇒ 2α1 Nqs1 + (2α2 N + 1/α2)qs2 + 2α3 Nqn
+ (γ1 N + 2)q∗s2 = a1 + a2 (48)
d(n)/d(qn) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs1 + α2 Nqs2 + (α3 + γ1)Nqn + q∗s2 = a1 (49)
After reassigning the alpha’s again to their starting values, we suppose that a member
of the second coalition joins the first coalition. This implies that α2 = α2 − 1./N . For
the new alpha’s, we solve the new optimization problem (50–52). In this optimization
problem, we have to treat (again) the abatement level of the country that leaves the
second coalition and joins the first one as a new variable, q5∗s1 . After solving the opti-
mization problem, we receive the abatement level for a country of the first coalition,
second coalition, non-signatories and the single country that leaves the second coali-
tion and joins the first one; we name these abatement levels by q5s1 , q5s2 , q5n and q5∗s1 .
Afterwards, we are able to find the profit of a player of the first coalition, second coa-
lition, non-signatories the country that leaves the first coalition and joins the second
one; we name these profits by π5s1 , π
5
s2 , π
5
n and π5∗s1 .
max(α1 Nπs1 + π5∗s1 ) (50)
s.t
d(s2) / d(Qs2)= 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs1 + (α2 N + γ2 / α2)Nqs2 +α3 Nqn + q∗s1 = a2 (51)
d(n)/d(qn) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs1 + α2 Nqs2 + (α3 + γ1)Nqn + q∗s1 = a1 (52)
Now we are able to state the conditions when the first coalition is myopic stable.
Definition 5.1 The first coalition is myopic stable if and only if the conditions 53–56
are satisfied:
π1n ≥ π2s1 ⇐⇒ if a nonsignatory joins the first coalition, it does not
increase its profit (53)
π1s1 ≥ π3n ⇐⇒ if a member of the first coalition joins the nonsignatories,
it does not increase its profit (54)
π1s1 ≥ π4∗s2 ⇐⇒ if a member of the first coalition joins the second coalition,
it does not increase its profit (55)
π1s2 ≥ π5∗s1 ⇐⇒ if a member of the second coalition joins the first coalition,
it does not increase its profit (56)
Clearly the conditions 55 and 56 has to be satisfied when the first coalition is myopic
stable, but they are not the only ones as we like the second coalitions to be myopic
stable too. In order to find other conditions that are satisfied when the second coalition
is myopic stable we need to solve some other optimizations problems.
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After reassigning the alpha’s again to their starting values, we suppose that a mem-
ber of the second coalition joins the non-signatories. This implies that α2 = α2−1./N .
For the new alpha’s, we solve the new optimization problem (57–60). In this optimi-
zation problem, we have to treat (again) the abatement level of the country that leaves
the second coalition and joins the non-signatories as a new variable, q6∗n . After solv-
ing the optimization problem, we receive the abatement level for a country of the
first coalition, second coalition, non-signatories and the country that leaves the second
coalition and joins the non-signatories; we name these abatement levels by q6s1 , q6s2 , q6n
and q6∗n . Then, we are able to find the profit of a player of the first coalition, second
coalition, non-signatories and the country that leaves the second coalition and joins
the non-signatories; we name these profits by π6s1 , π
6
s2 , π
6
n and π6∗n .
max(α1 Nπs1) (57)
s.t
d(s2)/d(Qs2) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs1 + (α2 N + γ2/α2)Nqs2 + α3 Nqn
+q∗n = a2 (58)
d(n)/d(q∗n ) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs1 + α2 Nqs2 + (α3 + γ1)Nqn + q∗n = a1 (59)
d(n)/d(qn) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs1 + α2 Nqs2 + α3 Nqn + (1 + γ2 N )q∗n = a2
(60)
After reassigning the alpha’s again to their starting values, we suppose that a member
of the non-signatories joins the second coalition. This implies that α3 = α3−1./N . For
the new alpha’s, we solve the new optimization problem (61–63). In this optimization
problem, we have to treat (again) the abatement level of the country that leaves the
non-signatories and joins the second coalition as a new variable, q7∗s2 . After solving
the optimization problem, we receive the abatement level for a country of the first
coalition, second coalition, non-signatories and the country that leaves the non-signa-
tories and joins the second coalition; we name these abatement levels by q7s1 , q7s2 , q7n
and q7∗s2 . Then, we are able to find the profit of a player of the first coalition, second
coalition, non-signatories and the country that leaves the non-signatories and joins the
second coalition; we name these profits by π7s1 , π
7
s2 , π
7
n and π7∗s2 .
max(α1 Nπs1) (61)
s.t
d(s2)/d(Qs2) = 0 ⇐⇒ 2α1 Nqs1 + (2α2 N + 1/α2)qs2 + 2α3 Nqn
+(γ1 N + 2)q∗s2 = a1 + a2 (62)
d(n)/d(qn) = 0 ⇐⇒ α1 Nqs1 + α2 Nqs2 + (α3 + γ1)Nqn + q∗s2 = a1 (63)
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Definition 5.2 The second coalition is myopic stable if and only if the conditions
53–56 are satisfied:
π1s1 ≥ π4∗s2 ⇐⇒ if a member of the first coalition joins the second coalition,
it does not increase its profit (64)
π1s2 ≥ π5∗s1 ⇐⇒ if a member of the second coalition joins the first coalition,
it does not increase its profit (65)
π1s2 ≥ π6∗n ⇐⇒ if a member of the second coalition joins the nonsignatories,
it does not increase its profit (66)
π1n ≥ π7∗s2 ⇐⇒ if a nonsignatory joins the second coalition, it does not
increase its profit (67)
Note that the conditions (55–56) are equivalent to conditions (64–65). As a conse-
quence, both coalitions are myopic stable when six conditions are satisfied, namely
(53–56) and (66–67). This concept of intercoalition stability is initially presented
(in a more general formulation) by Carraro (1999), which is a development of myo-
pic stability concept of D’Aspremont et al. (1983) when two (or more) IEA’s are
built.
After we solve all optimization problems, we test if six conditions are satisfied, and
we know if both coalitions are myopic stable or not. All the steps for finding myopic
stable coalitions, which we explained, are also shortly described in Table 4.
6 Simulation Results
Firstly, we introduce the simulation7 results for two myopic stable coalitions with
symmetric countries.
As we know from simulations that the important parameters are c (also γ ) and N ,
we introduce results by varying these parameters,8 see Tables 5 and 6.
We derive the main conclusion that if the damage cost is relative big (c large, which
implies also γ large), and if the number of countries is small then two coalitions
improve the welfare and abatement level significantly compared to one coalition. In
all cases, a higher N implies less additional welfare and abatement due to the second
coalition. So, a second coalition is more effective with a small number of countries
than with a large number.
7 All our simulations are performed by using the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox. The computer programs
can be provided to the reader on request.
8 We respect the conditions developed by Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2001) for the Barrett model, which
guarantee positive emissions in case of symmetric countries. These conditions mainly request that the
cost from pollution abatement (it means c and γ ) has to be sufficient high, which implies that emissions
decreasing worth. In case of asymmetric countries, it is more difficult (and probably impossible) to develop
conditions similar to Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2001), but we respect the principle that the cost from
pollution abatement are high, which implies that emissions decreasing is “interesting”.
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Table 4 Algorithm for finding myopic stable coalitions
a1, a2, b1, b2, c, α1, α2, α3, N are known parameters γ1 = c/b1 and γ2 = c/b2 optimization problems
find the abatement levels q, and then calculate profit π for a country which belongs to coalitions or
nonsignatories
Solving the initial optimization problem (44–46), we receive the abatement levels for a single country of
the first coalition (C1), second coalition (C2) and nonsignatories q1s1 , q1s2 and q1n and calculate the
profit for them π1s1 , π
1
s2 and π
1
n
Let α1 = α1 + 1./N and α3 = α3 − 1./N , we solve again the initial optimization problem (44–46) and
calculate the profit of single player of C1, C2 and nonsignatories (after we have found the abatement
levels of them), which we name by π2s1 , π2s2 and π2n
Reassign alpha’s again to their initial values, α1 = α1 − 1./N and α3 = α3 + 1./N
Let α1 = α1 − 1./N and α3 = α3 + 1./N , we solve again the initial optimization problem (44–46) and
calculate the profit of single player of C1, C2 and nonsignatories (after we have found the abatement
levels of them), which we name by π3s1 , π2s3 and π3n
Reassign alpha’s again to their initial values, α1 = α1 + 1./N and α3 = α3 − 1./N
Let α1 = α1 − 1./N , we solve the new optimization problem (47–49) and calculate the profit of single
player of C1, C2 and nonsignatories (after we have found the abatement levels of them), and the single
country that leaves C1 and joins C2, which we name by π4s1 , π4s2 , π4n and π4∗s2
Reassign alpha’s again to their initial values, α1 = α1 + 1./N
Let α2 = α2 − 1./N , we solve the new optimization problem (50–52) and calculate the profit of single
player of C1, C2 and nonsignatories (after we have found the abatement levels of them), and the single
country that leaves C2 and joins C1, which we name by π5s1 , π5s2 , π5n and π5∗s2
Reassign alpha’s again to their initial values, α2 = α2 + 1./N
Let α2 = α2 − 1./N , we solve the new optimization problem (57–59) and calculate the profit of single
player of C1, C2 and nonsignatories (after we have found the abatement levels of them), and the single
country that leaves C2 and joins the nonsignatories, which we name by π6s1 , π6s2 , π6n and π6∗s2
Reassign alpha’s again to their initial values, α2 = α2 + 1./N
Let α3 = α3 − 1./N , we solve the new optimization problem (61–63) and calculate the profit of single
player of C1, C2 and nonsignatories (after we have found the abatement levels of them), and the single
country that leaves the nonsignatories and joins C2, which we name by π7s1 , π7s2 , π7n and π7∗s2 If
π1n ≥ π2s1 ∧ π1s1 ≥ π3n ∧ π1s1 ≥ π4∗s2 ∧ π1s2 ≥ π5∗s1 ∧ π1s2 ≥ π6∗n ∧ π1n ≥ π7∗s2 then C1 and C2 are
myopic stable
The most interesting case remains the model of two myopic stable coalitions with
asymmetric countries.
Our simulations show that if two myopic stable coalitions are formed, the first type
of countries have the parameter a1 two or three times bigger than the parameter a2 of
second type of countries. The first type of countries have also the parameter c1 two or
three times smaller than the parameter c2 of second type of countries.
Our numerical computations show that all countries of second type must build one
IEA. If not, then two myopic coalitions are impossible to be formed. It follows an
important conclusion, namely all countries that have fewer benefits and higher cost
from pollution abatement must build a coalition. Then, there is hope that two myopic
stable coalition can be formed.
Tables 7, 9 and 11 present cases where two IEA’s worsen the welfare and abatement
levels compared to one IEA. On the opposite Table 8, 10 and 12 introduce a case where
two IEA’s improve the welfare and abatement levels compared to one IEA.
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Table 5 Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA for
different c
A second s.e IEA increases welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 0.25 1.5 10
Coalition structure α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn πs1 πs2 πn Q 
One coalition 0.2∗ – 2.5∗ – 1.4∗ 32.5∗ – 35.6∗ 16.1∗ 349.6∗
Two coalitions 0.3∗ 0.2∗ 3.4∗ 2.4∗ 1.3∗ 39.4∗ 43.9∗ 46.9∗ 21.6∗ 440.7∗
a b c N
100 0.25 1 10
Coalition structure α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn πs1 πs2 πn Q 
Full noncooperative 0 – – – 2 – – 43 20 430
Full cooperative 1 – 7.14 – – 89.29 – – 71.4 892.9
One coalition 0.2∗ – 3.2∗ – 1.9∗ 43.8∗ – 47.2∗ 22.1∗ 465.3∗
Two coalitions 0.3∗ 0.2∗ 4.4∗ 3.2∗ 1.8∗ 51.4∗ 56.1∗ 59.6∗ 28.5∗ 564.2∗
The symbol * we use to mark stability abatement values, and it is valid for all tables
Table 6 Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA with sym-
metric countries for different N
A second IEA increases welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 25 150 10
Coalition structure α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn πs1 πs2 πn Q 
Full noncooperative 0 – – – 1.43 – – 3163.3 14.3 31632.7
Full cooperative 1 – 6.25 – – 7812.5 – – 62.5 78125
One coalition 0.2∗ – 2.5∗ – 1.4∗ 3248.4∗ – 3558.3∗ 16.1∗ 34962.8∗
Two coalitions 0.3∗ 0.2∗ 3.4∗ 2.4∗ 1.3∗ 3942.6∗ 4385.2 4693.4∗ 21.6∗ 44065.4∗
a b c N
100 25 150 20
Coalition structure α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn πs1 πs2 πn Q 
Full noncooperative 0 – – – 0.71 – – 1619.9 14.3 32398
Full cooperative 1 – 3.85 – – 4807.7 – – 76.9 96153.9
One coalition 0.1∗ – 1.2∗ – 0.7∗ 1716.1∗ – 1518.1∗ 15.2∗ 34171.3∗
Two coalitions 0.15∗ 0.1∗ 1.8∗ 1.2∗ 0.7∗ 1811.6∗ 1937.3∗ 2013.0∗ 18.0∗ 39504.3∗
a b c N
100 25 150 100
Coalition structure α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn πs1 πs2 πn Q 
Full noncooperative 0 – – – 0.14 – – 330.1 14.3 33010.2
Full cooperative 1 – 0.94 – – 1179.2 – – 94.3 117924.5
One coalition 0.03∗ – 0.37∗ – 0.14∗ 333.9∗ – 342.5∗ 14.86 34219.7∗
Two coalitions 0.03∗ 0.02∗ 0.36∗ 0.24∗ 0.14∗ 337.7∗ 343.2∗ 346.1∗ 15.03∗ 34583.0∗
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Table 7 Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA with
asymmetric countries where the first myopic stable coalition is built by countries of first type
a1 a2 b c1 c2 N
104 30 1.5 2.5 4.8 10
Coalition structure q1 q2 π1 π2 Q 
Full cooperative 7.2 3.8 565.5 −13.2 54.9 2761.5
Full noncooperative 4.8 0.17 310.6 65.3 24.6 1879.2
Coalition structure α1 qs1 qn1 qn2 πs1 πn1 πn2 Q 
One coalition 0.3∗ 9.6∗ 4.1∗ −0.19∗ 338.5∗ 375.3∗ 67.5∗ 36∗ 2258.8∗
Coalition structure α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn πs1 πs2 πn Q 
Two coalitions 0.3∗ 0.5∗ 7∗ 4.4∗ 0.007∗ 349.4∗ 443.5∗ 64.7∗ 29.9∗ 2258.8∗
The second IEA worsens welfare and abatement
If the economical-environmental cost-benefit functions determine that the first myo-
pic coalition is formed by first type of countries, then two IEA’s worsen abatement and
welfare compared to one IEA. The explanation is that the first countries have bigger
benefits from pollution abatement (because of big a1) and they have high abatement
levels. As the second type of countries has smaller benefits from abatement, when
they formed their second coalition (they increase also their abatement levels), but they
impose to the first coalition a significant reduction of their abatement levels. Conse-
quently, it follows that the welfare and abatement levels are worse compare to one
coalition. On the other side, the non-signatories (of first or second type countries)
have very low or negative abatement levels, which means that they have no possibility
to increase their welfare by abating pollution. The myopic world has exhausted its
resources to improve welfare and abatement levels.
But, if the economical-environmental cost-benefit functions affect that the first myo-
pic coalition is formed by second type of countries, then two IEA’s improve abatement
and welfare compared to one IEA. As the first type of countries has bigger benefits from
abatement, when they formed their second coalition, they perform a significant reduc-
tion of their abatement levels. Consequently, it follows that the welfare and abatement
levels are improved compared to one coalition. The first coalition improved the welfare
and abatement almost equally when the second coalition is formed or not. On the other
side, the non-signatories (there only signatories of countries of first type) have low
or negative abatement levels, but they cannot offset the improvement in welfare and
abatement by second coalition. The myopic world can perform small improvement to
welfare and abatement levels.
Even in models with asymmetric countries a higher N implies less additional welfare
and abatement due to the second coalition. So, a second coalition is again more effec-
tive with a small number of countries than with a large number.
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Table 8 Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA with
asymmetric countries where the first myopic stable coalition is built by countries of second type
a1 a2 b c1 c2 N
124 30 1.5 3.7 8 10
Coalition structure q1 q2 π1 π2 Q 
Full cooperative 7.9 3.6 707.6 −42.6 57.6 3325.1
Full noncooperative 4.1 0.16 334.2 62 21.6 1981.3
Coalition structure α21 q
2
s1 qn1 qn2 π
2
s1 πn1 πn2 Q 
One coalition 0.5∗ 4.1∗ 0.54∗ − 359.1∗ 62.8∗ − 23.1∗ 2109.5∗
Coalition structure α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn πs1 πs2 πn Q 
Two coalitions 0.3∗ 0.5∗ 7.4∗ 3.8∗ 0.013∗ 387.6∗ 67.5∗ 461.6∗ 29.9∗ 2423.4∗
The second IEA improves welfare and abatement
Table 9 Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA with
asymmetric countries where the first myopic stable coalition is built by countries of first type
a1 a2 b c1 c2 N
84 30 1.5 2.1 2.4 20
Coalition structure q1 q2 π1 π2 Q 
Full cooperative 3.4 3 240 −24.7 65.7 3476.5
Full noncooperative 1.9 0.02 148.7 33.7 29.4 2398.7
Coalition structure α1 qs1 qn1 qn2 πs1 πn1 πn2 Q 
One coalition 0.15∗ 3.5∗ 1.8∗ −0.071∗ 151.5∗ 33.5∗ 160.7∗ 32.3∗ 2551.2∗
Coalition structure α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn πs1 πs2 πn Q 
Two coalitions 0.15∗ 0.25∗ 2.6∗ 1.9∗ −0.066∗ 149.9∗ 33.7∗ 153.1∗ 30.4∗ 2455.7∗
The second IEA worsens welfare and abatement
Table 10 Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA with
asymmetric countries where the first myopic stable coalition is built by countries of second type
a1 a2 b c1 c2 N
124 30 1.5 4.1 8 20
Coalition structure q1 q2 π1 π2 Q 
Full cooperative 4.9 2.5 474.9 −113.7 87 6555
Full noncooperative 1.8 0.03 215.9 33.4 26.8 3405.9
Coalition structure α21 q
2
s1 qn1 qn2 π
2
s1 πn1 πn2 Q 
One coalition 0.25∗ 1.77∗ 0.11∗ − 218.2∗ 33.4∗ − 27.1∗ 3439.3∗
Coalition structure α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn πs1 πs2 πn Q 
Two coalitions 0.15∗ 0.25∗ 3.5∗ 1.7∗ −0.04∗ 225.6∗ 33.7∗ 245∗ 30.8∗ 3785.7∗
The second IEA improves welfare and abatement
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Table 11 Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA with
asymmetric countries where the first myopic stable coalition is built by countries of first type
a1 a2 b c1 c2 N
132 50 1.5 2.1 3.2 100
Coalition structure q1 q2 π1 π2 Q 
Full cooperative 1.2 0.8 127.6 −16.9 118 10589.7
Full noncooperative 0.6 610−4 79.7 18.7 49.9 7058.4
Coalition structure α1 qs1 qn1 qn2 πs1 πn1 πn2 Q 
One coalition 0.03∗ 1.05∗ 0.6∗ −0.003 79.79∗ 79.9∗ 18.7 50∗ 7144.36∗
Coalition structure α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn πs1 πs2 πn Q 
Two coalitions 0.03∗ 0.15∗ 0.66∗ 0.58∗ −0.0007∗ 79.96∗ 80.77∗ 18.75∗ 50.71∗ 7072.56∗
The second IEA worsens welfare and abatement
Table 12 Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA with
asymmetric countries where the first myopic stable coalition is built by countries of second type
a1 a2 b c1 c2 N
126 30 1.5 4.1 3.6 100
Coalition structure q1 q2 π1 π2 Q 
Full cooperative 1.21 1.01 114.5 −42.3 108.7 9097.3
Full noncooperative 0.35 0.0004 49.5 6.7 29.9 4312.4
Coalition structure α21 q
2
s1 qn1 qn2 π
2
s1 πn1 πn2 Q 
One coalition 0.15∗ 0.35∗ 0.003∗ − 49.6∗ 6.7∗ − 29.93∗ 4316.6∗
Coalition structure α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn πs1 πs2 πn Q 
Two coalitions 0.15∗ 0.03∗ 0.47∗ 0.35∗ −0.006∗ 49.6∗ 49.8∗ 6.7∗ 30.09∗ 4336.5∗
The second IEA improves welfare and abatement
7 Conclusions
The paper investigates the size and the improving capability of two self-enforcing IEA.
An IEA is self-enforcing when no country wants to withdraw and no country wants
to join the IEA. As we employ a simplified model the results must be interpreted with
caution. Although, our work is less general than that of Yi and Shin, Bloch etc. we
actually count up for asymmetric players and are able to compute the coalition sizes
and optimal abatement levels.
We find that adding a second coalition improves welfare and environmental quality
when the number of players is small and cost of pollution is high. That is, multiple
coalitions help with continental environmental problems, but not with global envi-
ronmental problems. At first sight, this conclusion is counterintuitive. Surely, bigger
problems require a larger number of coalitions? However, the intuition behind the
result follows from Barrett (1994) analysis. Barrett shows that stable coalitions are
either small or irrelevant. “He also shows” / “Here we extend that result to show” that
the share of players that cooperate grows if the number of players falls.
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Consider a serious environmental problem with a large number of players. Accord-
ing to Barrett, only a small coalition would form. If we take the cooperative players
out of the population, we are left with a still large number of players with a still serious
environmental problem. In this subpopulation, only a small coalition would form. So, a
second coalition does not add much. In fact, the additional constraint of inter-coalition
stability more than offsets the gains of cooperation in the second coalition.
Now consider a serious environmental problem with a medium number of players.
According to Barrett, only a small coalition would form. If we take these players out
of the population, we are left with a smaller number of players with a considerable
environmental problem. In this subpopulation, a larger coalition would form. That is,
a second coalition does improve the welfare and environmental quality. In this case,
the inter-coalition stability constraint reduces but not eliminates these gains.
If this intuition is correct, one may suspect that an environmental problem with a
large number of players requires a high number of coalitions—and that only the “last”
coalition will contribute to gains in welfare and environmental quality. However, with
every additional coalition, the number of inter-coalition stability constraints grows
combinatorially. This would offset these gains, and limits the number of coalitions
that can form. This problem is deferred to future research.
Our numerical computations show that all countries of second type must build one
IEA. If not, then two myopic coalitions are not possible to be formed. It follows an
important conclusion, namely all countries that have fewer benefits and higher cost
from pollution abatement must build a coalition. Then, there is hope that two myopic
stable coalition can be formed.
Moreover, if the cost-benefit functions of pollution abatement determine that the
first myopic coalition is formed by first type of countries, then two IEA’s decrease
abatement and welfare compared to one IEA. The clarification is that the first coun-
tries have bigger benefits from pollution abatement (because of big a1) and they have
high abatement levels. As the second type of countries has smaller benefits from
abatement, when they formed their second coalition (they increase also their abate-
ment levels) but they indirectly impose to the first coalition a significant reduction of
their abatement levels. Consequently, it follows that the welfare and abatement levels
are decreased compare to one coalition. On the other side, the non-signatories (of first
or second type countries) have very low or negative abatement levels, which means
that they are not able to improve their welfare by abating pollution.
But, if the cost-benefit functions of the pollution abatement effect that the first myo-
pic coalition is formed by second type of countries, then two IEA’s improve abatement
and welfare compared to one IEA. As the first type of countries has bigger benefits
from abatement, when they formed their second coalition, they perform a signifi-
cant reduction of their abatement levels. Consequently, it follows that the welfare and
abatement levels are improved compared to one coalition. The first coalition improves
the welfare and abatement almost equally when the second coalition is formed or
not. On the other side, the non-signatories (there only signatories of countries of first
type) have low or negative abatement levels, but they cannot offset the improvement
in welfare and abatement by second coalition.
As always, further research is needed in independence cost function, issue linkage,
repeated games, uncertainty or limited information.
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